Introduction
Empirical measurements in experimental economics (EE) are derived from observations of human behavior in the laboratory. Most of these measurements are estimating economic rationality in the sense that they indicate general tendencies over a sample of observed choices, pointing toward hypothesized effects about various forms of behavioral consistency (e.g., under uncertainty, over time, regarding other people). Various statistical tools are used to allow for comparisons between and/or within subjects, typically opposing treatment and non-treatment conditions. The validity of these estimations thus crucially depends on statistical methods. Furthermore, socio-history of quantification (Desrosières, 1993) points that statistical methods also shape the content of concepts under estimation. Hence, beyond validity, statistical methods are also likely to shape the meaning of economic rationality in experimental economics.
Yet histories of EE do not give much importance to statistics (Roth, 1995; Moscati et al., 2007; Heukelom, 2009; Svorenčík, 2015) . It seems that in the early years of EE, lab experiments raised different methodological issues. In particular, experimental economists had to convince their fellow economists that data produced in the laboratory allow to make valid assumptions about the "real world". This problem known as external validity is a recurring difficulty for EE (Levitt and List, 2007) . Statistics are also always absent from most methodological reflexions on EE (Guala, 2005; Fréchette and Schotter, 2015) 1 .
Significantly, the Guidelines for Submission of Manuscripts on Experimental
Economics by Palfrey and Porter only mentions that "the data appendix should be sufficiently detailed to permit computation of the statistics" but contains no specific rule for statistical treatments (Palfrey and Porter, 1991) . Statistics are clearly a minor topic in EE's methodology. In a footnote of his 2005 book, Guala gives the following justification to exclude statistics from his methodological analysis of EE :
"Data are then analyzed statistically. The techniques used for this job (significance tests, correlation, regression analysis, etc.) are not the subject of this book, so I shall not get into the technical details of data analysis -which can differ considerably depending on the type of experiment" (Guala, 2005, pp.35-36) According to Guala, statistics do not really matter in EE's methodology for two reasons:
1. statistical methods depend on the "type of experiment" 2. statistics is merely a technical (non-methodological) issue
We will refer in this paper to the first claim as the "experiment-dependency hypothesis" and to the second one as the "technical hypothesis". If both hypotheses are valid, statistics do not play an important role in shaping the experiment itself. The technical hypothesis seems intuitively appealing. It is all the more convincing that most statistical treatments are nowadays automatized through computer software. But statistical methods in EE have changed lot since the early experiments of the 1950's. As we shall see in greater details, regression is unavoidable in the recent literature, while it was not used by most of the first generation of experimental economists (though it was used in other areas of economics). Contrary to experiment-dependency hypothesis (cf. supra), similar "type of experiments" do not have always required the exact same statistical techniques in the history of EE. It is true that statistics are increasingly standardized in EE. Yet standard methods are recent and the process of standardization itself can be interrogated from the viewpoint of a socio-history of quantification (Desrosières, 1993) . It is our contention that statistics plays an important role in the way EE estimates rationality in economics, even if this role remains largely "unconscious" for economists. This article aims to investigate the historical roots of current statistical methods in EE. To do so, we analyze the use of statistical tools in EE from the early 1940's to the present days. Statistical methods are understood in the light of "research tactics" in EE. The evolution of statistics and research tactics explains the successive approaches that experimental economists used to estimated economic rationality. Our narrative is based on both qualitative (reading and interpretation of relevant literature, interviews with experimental economists) and quantitative insights. Bibliometric methods were necessary to study the post-1970 period, because the 1970's saw a very large development of EE's literature, and the great number of EE's publications prevents from analyzing the literature in a quasi-exhaustive and qualitative manner as we do for earlier time periods. The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 covers early experiments from . We analyze the importance of descriptive statistic and discuss the few attempts to sophisticate statistical methods in economic experiments. In section 2, we introduce EE's statistical pioneers of the 1960's and statistical controversies in psychological research. Section 3 analyzes the "boom" of EE from 1969 to 1995. The large increase in the number of publications is associated with a greater variety in the choice of statistical techniques. Section 4 describes the process of standardization in statistical methods that happened in the later time period (1995 to the present day).
1 Early experiments : Taking the "metrics" out of experimental econometrics What is striking in early experiments from 1931 2 to 1959 is the quasi-absence of statistical analysis. A first explication is that some of these experiments were actually specifically dedicated to model individual choice and in particular to measure utility 3 . They did not require between-subjects comparisons and computation over aggregated data. For instance, Louis Thurstone's "first" 4 experiment (to construct utility curves under certainty) was based on a single subject! Another example is Mosteller and Nogee in their well-known 1951 experiment, which aimed to construct individual utility curves (from observed choices under risk). Similarly, Davidson and Marschak (1959) or Royden, Suppes and Walsh (1959) proposed psychometric methods for the experimental measurement of utility. In these experiments, data were presented and discussed quasiexclusively at the individual level 5 and no particular statistical treatment was needed 6 . An associated publishing practice that almost disappeared nowadays 2 Historians of EE usually consider Louis Thurstone's 1931 study as the first experiment in economics (Roth, 1995; Moscati et al., 2007; Heukelom, 2009; Svorenčík, 2015) , even if Thurstone was not an economist. We follow this convention and start our narrative in 1931, even if most "early" economic experiments were actually published in the late 1940's and in the 1950's.
3 On experimental measurements of utility, see Moscati, 2016. 4 Cf supra, footnote 2. 5 They are a few inter-group comparisons in Mosteller and Nogee's paper, such as the following claim: "it seems clear that student Groups A and B differed in their reactions to the high-valued, low-probability hands. Every B subject wants more money to play the 20 to 1 and 200 to 1 hands than any A subject" (Mosteller and Nogee, 1951, p.386) . But such claims never involve accurate statistical considerations. Mosteller and Nogee are primarily interested in this experiment in individual choice, and inter-individual comparisons are more like "by-products" of the study. 6 The only exception we found was Royden et al.'s article. In this study, the authors 4 consisted in presenting graphics about single subjects (see figure 1 below). Even experiments exploiting collective data did not make use of statistical treatments. This the case of Chamberlin's famous experimental market.
Chamberlin studied experimentally the tendency for observed prices to converge toward competitive equilibrium. Data were discussed in a mostly qualitative manner: "average price was higher than the equilibrium price seven times and lower thirty-nine times. The [. . . ] equilibrium values were different in each example, and no statistical computations for the entire sample of fortysix experiments have been made. The simple figures, however, clearly indicate divergences not to be attributed to chance" (Chamberlin, 1948, p.97) . Data spoke for themselves: the fact that prices were lower thirty-nine times out of forty-six experiments "clearly indicates" a solution to the theoretical problem.
No computation was therefore needed, except a few basic statistics (average and median prices, standard-deviation eventually). The privilege of raw data over more sophisticated statistics was also associated with an important role played performed a chi-square test to compare the prediction of two models (Royden, Suppes and Walsh, 1959) .
by graphics. As data were seen as direct sources of evidence, their visual display in graphics and charts occupied a central role in published articles. Discussion of results usually took the form of a detailed description of graphics. This was particularly the case for studies in which the initial theoretical problem consists in appreciating the "convergence" toward a theoretical prediction, such as Chamberlin's article for instance. Another good example is Hogatt's 1959 paper on business game, in which the results are mainly interpreted through the following detailed graphic: equilibrium there if play had continued". This graphic in particular about industry I shows that it is "very close to an equilibrium of a mixed kind with the middle firm long-run and other firms short-run" (Hoggatt, 1959, p.200) . When it comes to appreciate some kind of convergence toward a prediction level over time, graphics are seen as a better source of evidence than simple figures, which might discard important information about noise, erratic moves, and long-term tendency.
In this article, we call "descriptive statistic" this very basic approach requiring only qualitative insights, computation of simple statistics (e.g., mean, median, standard-deviation) and graphical analysis (for another example see also (Lieberman, 1960; Rousseas and Hart, 1951) . The problem with descriptive statistics is that it involves some imprecision in the discussion of results.
For instance, in a bargaining game, Flood observed that "there was a decided tendency to start with [the equilibrium point]and then to shift to [a better equilibrium] rather consistently after about thirty trial" (Flood, 1958, pp.14-15) .
The claim is based merely on a qualitative inspection of raw data (individual choices). In a similar manner, Hogatt noticed "important" differences in individual profits in his business game (Hoggatt, 1959) . Descriptive statistics allows to explore the data and to make hypotheses about possible effects: convergence or divergence (e.g., Chamberlin 1948; Flood 1958), similarity or difference (e.g., Hoggatt, 1959) . But the problem is that it does not provide any statistical criteria to assess the significance of these effects: do individuals really differ in individual profits? How consistent is the tendency to shift to a better equilibrium?
These problems in the interpretation of data did not raise difficulties for early EE, because the focus was mostly theoretical (and not empirical). A good illustration is May's article on intransitive patterns of choices (May, 1954) . The paper begins with five pages of pure theory; experimental evidence is then shortly presented in four pages and the last five pages discuss how observed choice may result from the form of the preference aggregating function. Overall, the article is for the main parts concerned with introducing theoretical problems and explaining how empirical evidence could be accommodated into the theory.
Similarly, in Hoggatt's paper (1959) , seven pages out of twelve are dedicated to the theoretical description and analysis of the game. Most early experimental publications did not distinguish separate sections for methods, results and discussion of empirical findings, as it is now conventionally the case. May both present and discuss data in a single section entitled "evidence for intransitivity". There is no need to detail how data are produced and interpreted because they directly provide "evidence for" (or against) theoretical propositions. In particular, May observed that some patterns of choice are intransitive without discussing their frequency. May recognizes that "of course it does not prove that individual patterns are always intransitive. It does, however, suggest that where choice depends on conflicting criteria, preference patterns may be intransitive unless one criterion dominates" (May, 1954, p.7) . Even if the fraction of intransitive patterns was very small and negligible, the fact that choices "may" be intransitive was worth noticing for the theorist (who supposes that they are never intransitive). In other words, there was no need to assess the significance of an observed effect, because the mere observation itself was sufficient to point out a theoretical problem.
Statistical methods and the choice of descriptive statistics in early experiments seem to have been dictated by this strong theoretical focus. This state of affairs cannot be explained by the fact that inferential statistics were unknown among economists conducting experiments. Indeed, we found one exception in the 1950's experimental literature, Davidson and Marschak (1959) , who used sophisticated statistical tools involving hypothesis testing and computation of likelihood ratios. They also propose a very rare reflection on Type II errors (1959, p.37 ). Interestingly, this paper was on stochastic choice. It can thus be suggested that it is because the theoretical problem at stake was stochastic, ie., involving the consideration of random process, that the discussion of empirical findings was more statistically grounded.
Early EE was thus characterized by both a strong theoretical focus and a neglect of basic statistical issues. The last observation might be understood as confirming Guala's technical hypothesis: statistics are a minor issue, because there was no need to use statistics in early experiments. But as we shall see in the next sections, this was not the case for subsequent (similar) experiments, thus rejecting the "experiment-dependency" hypothesis. In our opinion, (lack of) statistics in the 1950's already played a role in shaping rationality in EE. How?
It can be hypothesized that the strong theoretical focus and the neglect of basic statistical issues were part of a general "research tactics" of early EE.
Early experimentalists were primarily concerned with convincing their fellow 8 economists of the potential of lab experiments in economics. This is the reason why the main parts of EE's publications in the 1950's were dedicated to theoretical issues. Contrary to other experimental discipline's conventions, early EE was not primarily concerned to the establishment of empirical regularities.
Experimental economists were not estimating but still theorizing rationality in economics. In the articles above mentioned, empirical data were either i) pieces of evidence showing that something was wrong with the theory and an alternative explanation was needed (e.g., May 1954) or ii) direct implementations or measurements of the theory itself (e.g., Thurstone, 1931; Mosteller and Nogee, 1951; Davidson and Suppes, 1957) . In the end, statistics played no direct role in this theoretical agenda, but their absence tells something about this theoretical agenda: experimental economics were trying to speak the same language as the rest of the profession. In the 1950's, this common language required only descriptive statistics. Recent historical work by Jeff Biddle shows indeed that inductive statistics based on probability theory were not really influential in economics in the postwar period until the 1970's, despite the birth of "Cowles Commission" econometrics in the same period (Biddle, 2017).
Neglect of statistics in the 1950's has therefore to be understood in the light of the "research tactics" of experimental economists of the period, that were struggling for distinguishing themselves from econometrics. The intellectual trajectory of EE's pioneers described by Svorenčík (2015) suggests that lab experiments were conceived at first as an alternative to classical "Cowles" econometrics which was striving at the time. Early experimentalists such as James Fox turned to lab experiments because they had became suspicious toward the liability of public data used in econometrics (Svorenčík, 2015, pp.46-49) . EE was seen as a different method (and not a different subfield) than econometrics because it could produce "controlled data". It is therefore no surprise that the methods of EE and econometrics were considered as separated, and even opposed. The main matter of EE was not to discuss statistics as statistical issues belong to econometrics. The novelty of EE was rather that data were produced in laboratories: hence, the strongest objection toward EE was that such data were lacking of external validity (cf. Svorenčík, 2015), and statistical soundness in the interpretation of results may have been seen as a rather minor concern. Yet both EE and econometrics belong to the genre of "applied" or "empirical" economics. From a purely theoretical (non-historical) perspective, EE like econometrics should involve estimation techniques and thus statistics (cf. introduction). In other words, EE should have been called from the beginning "ex-perimental econometrics", referring to the statistical analysis of controlled data in economics. From a historical perspective, it appears that the initial view of EE as an alternative (and a rival) method to econometrics led to take the "metrics" out of experimental econometrics, meaning that experimental economists were promoting the purity of their controlled data without attaching importance to statistical methods. considered as a problem worth discussing and alternative statistical techniques 7 Sidney Siegel wrote also in 1956 a book entitled Nonparametric statistics for the behavioral sciences. The book seems to have been quite influential in EE, according to Maas and Svorenčík's Witness seminar (Svorenčík and Maas, 2015, pp.76-78 ). Yet it was meant for the behavioral sciences, and had been manly cited in non-economic disciplines. We thus consider that Siegel's 1956 book was still a psychologist's contribution for psychologists.
8 Experimental tests of learning theory were the main topic of the book. It was not at the time a central topic in EE; the book was not only nor mainly designed for an economic audience and became also influential in mathematical psychology. Yet it clearly revealed a renewed interest in statistics among researcher performing economic experiments.
were considered to discriminate between the two hypotheses at stake ("excess rent" and "Walrasian hypotheses"). Last but not least, his 1964 article ends with a Bayesian subjective probability analysis. As we shall see in the next subsection, Bayesian statistics are mostly ignored in EE and radically change the classical approach toward hypothesis testing: it is not anymore a matter of saying if the null is rejected at (usually) the 5% level; the objective is to compute the posterior probability the "true" hypothesis is true based upon certain a priori specified probabilities. Smith has always preferred the Bayesian approach 9 and gave Bayesian reports in another article published in 1964 (Rice and Smith, 1964) and two subsequent publications (McCabe, Rassenti and Smith, 1996; Durham, Hirshleifer and Smith, 1998) . Smith's openness to Bayesian methods also reflects a more reflexive conception of statistics: later on, he exchanged a series of letters with Deirdre McCloskey about the issue of statistical significance 10 . It is worth noticing that Smith took econometric courses at Harvard from Guy Orcutt, who was an early advocate of the inductive theory of statistical inference and played an important role in its diffusion in economic research (Biddle, 2017, p.163) . It can thus be hypothesized that Smith's sensitivity toward statistical issues was rather unusual (exceptional?) among his fellow economists of the 1950's.
Indeed, Smith's statistical methods did not gain indeed immediate recognition in EE. In the early 1960's, descriptive statistics were the still the most common way to interpret experimental result in influential experimental papers (Fellner, 1961; Shubik, 1962; Maschler, 1965; Lave, 1962; Bower, 1965; MacCrimmon, 1968 ). For instance, Shubik rejects theoretical hypotheses "as frequencies [of choosing some solution] appear when none are predicted [by these hypotheses]" (Shubik, 1962, p.227) . Rejecting hypotheses merely requires observing choices that violates them; frequencies of such choices do not need therefore to be statistically tested. It should be noted that the Quaterly Journal of Economics published the first and the last two above mentioned articles (Fellner, 1961; Lave, 1962; Bower, 1965) . This journal is known to have a strong theoretical focus, which might have biased these papers against presentation of data 9 "I long had preferred Reverend Bayes" (personal communication to the authors, 27/05/2017). and statistical analysis.
But the 1960's witnessed a progressive yet clear rupture in statistical methods. Descriptive statistics were gradually replaced by hypothesis testing and regression analysis in experimental economics. This first started in psychological review such as Behavioral science (Becker, DeGroot and Marschak, 1963a; Hoggatt, 1967; Rapoport and Cole, 1968) 
The birth of a long-standing statistical controversy in psychology
In the 1960's, EE was still burgeoning. A few experimental economists succeeded in publishing their studies in top-rank economics reviews such as the AER or QJE but many early economic experiments were published in noneconomic reviews, in particular psychological ones (cf. supra be published 11 ! This is not to say that NHST was universally recognized as the 11 "In editing the Journal there has been a strong reluctance to accept and publish results related to the principal concern of the research when those results were significant at the .05 level, whether by one-or two-tailed test. This has not implied a slavish worship of the .01 level, as some critics may have implied. Rather,it reflects a belief that it is the responsibility of the investigator in a science to reveal his effect in such a way that no reasonable man would be in a position to discredit the results by saying that they were the product of the way the ball bounces" (Melton, 1962, pp.553-554) .
"best practice" in psycholoy. NHST raised an important and long-lasting debate in the 1960's, starting with fierce critics by Rozeboom (1960); Cohen (1962) ; Bakan (1966) , with subsequent responses (Chow, 1988 (Chow, , 1989 (Chow, , 1991 . Nowadays, NHST is still very controversial in psychology. We are interested in this debate only in order to show that it had almost no echo in EE. Hence we provide here only a very brief account of the main objections toward EE and then explain how these objections were largely not discussed in EE 12 .
Critics of NHST do not criticize NHST per se, but rather the way it is commonly applied in the academic literature. Following Gigerenzer, "standard" academic NHST can be summarized in the following three steps: "(1) set up a statistical null hypothesis, but do not specify your own hypothesis nor any alternative hypothesis, (2) use the 5% significance level for rejecting the null and accepting your hypothesis, and (3) always perform this procedure" (Gigerenzer, 2004, p.587) . A first problem with this method is that it leads to overemphasize the importance of statistical significance over size effect. Significant effects might not be important (practically or theoretically); insignificant but large effect might be on the contrary worth reporting.
Another problem is that type II errors are not considered and NHST are often underpowered. In 1962, Cohen showed in a famous article that most research in abnormal social psychology was severely underpowered and actually led to the failure to reject null hypotheses which were actually false (Cohen, 1962) . Following Cohen, many studies on statistical power have been conducted in psychological research (Brewer, 1972; Katzer and Sodt, 1973; Haase, 1974; Chase and Tucker, 1975; Kroll and Chase, 1975; Chase and Baran, 1976; Chase and Chase, 1976; Sawyer and Ball, 1981; Sedlmeier and Gigerenzer, 1989) . The result of these surveys is alarming, because they point out that a large part of experimental research reveal effects that are actually false, due to statistical underpower. But at least these problems are known and analyzed as such in psychology; some researchers are very proactive in this matter, like Cohen who dedicated an entire book on the subject (Cohen, 1969) . The problem is also discussed in empirical economics (see the recent survey of Ioannidis, Stanley and Doucouliagos 2016).We found no similar study in EE. The only exception was a 2013 article by Zhang and Ortmann, which also conclude on severe underpower in EE. It is worth noticing that this 2013 working paper has not been published, probably suggesting a lack of interest in this matter among experimental economists (Zhang and Ortmann, 2013) 13 NHST also raises "Bayesian" objections. NHST implies a binary interpretation of statistics: hypotheses are either accepted or rejected at a given significance level. The Bayesian approach favors instead the computation of "likelihood ratios" (cf. previous subsection). It is the reason why Bayesian critics often recommend to report exact p-values instead of claiming significant results at some significance level 14 . Bayesian psychologists might be under-represented but at least they get some diffusion (see in particular the very high GS citation A last problem associated with NHST is the misinterpretation of p-values. A p-value is the probability to get the observed result under a true null. It should not be confused with the probability to wrongly accept the null. Psychologists have conducted many studies showing that both students and researchers do misunderstand NHST and significance tests this way, using questionnaires (Rosenthal and Gaito, 1963; Tversky and Kahneman, 1971; Oakes, 1986; Falke and Greenbaum, 1995; Haller and Krauss, 2002) . Once again, we found no similar studies in EE. Also, a quick look into GS citations indicated that none of the studies mentioned above is quoted in a significant manner in the EE literature 15 . It is all the more surprising that the scientific community has been 13 Recently, Bellemare and his coauthors published an article about statistical power in the Journal of the Economic Science Association (Bellemare, Bissonnette and Kröger, 2016) . The authors propose a STATA package to estimate statistical power in economic experiments. Yet once again, this contribution is meant to provide a purely technical solution. This technique is illustrated with a short comparison of two studies in gift field experiments, but the authors do not conduct a systematic survey of the literature similar to the one realized in other experimental disciplines (e.g., Cohen, 1962, cf. Supra).
14 "Bayesian" psychologists often consider themselves as unfairly ignored. They frequently invoked historical arguments to their case. For instance, Gigerenzer argues that the problem came from Fisher's influence in the history of statistics, and favors instead the Neyman-Pearson approach (the case is very frequent in most of Gigerenzer's works; similar arguments about Fisher's influence are to be found in (non-experimental) economics in Zilliak and Mc-Closkey (Ziliak and McCloskey 2008b; Ziliak 2008, cf. infra) . The purpose of our article is not to assess the historical accuracy of these claims, but it is worth noticing such attempts to rehabilitate Bayesian statistics in psychology. We found no such references to Bayesian statistics in EE in all periods, except in Smith 1964; Rice and Smith 1964; McCabe, Rassenti and Smith 1996; Durham, Hirshleifer and Smith 1998 (cf. supra) . Bayesian approaches are sometimes applied in EE to optimize experimental designs, (e.g., El-Gamal, McKelvey and Palfrey 1993; El-Gamal and Palfrey 1996; Kessels, Jones and Goos 2011 or in structural modeling to find the model best fitting the data (e.g. Cipriani, Costantini and Guarino, 2012), but Bayesian statistics in bot cases are not used to discuss experimental results nor to assess the validity of hypotheses in the way above mentioned 15 The only exception would be Tversky and Kahneman's study on the law of "small numbers" Tversky and Kahneman (1971) . Belief in this law led in this experiment to statistical increasingly concerned with p-values and their interpretations in recent years (Nuzzo, 2014; Wasserstein and Lazar, 2016) . This concern has led the Ameri- increasing concern for improving statistical practices. It includes for instance recommendations to report confidence intervals and effects sizes. The manual clearly recognizes the controversy over NHST even if its recommendations remain controversial (Fidler, 2002) .
The controversy over NHST echoed in economics and econometrics, in particular with the debate about "statistical significance" initiated by McCloskey and Zilliak (McCloskey and Ziliak, 1996; Spanos, 2008; Ziliak and McCloskey, 2008a; Hoover and Siegler, 2008b,a; McCloskey and Ziliak, 2008; Ziliak, 2008) .
NHST and statistical power is also a very controversial subject in neuroscience for instance (e.g., Ioannidis 2005; Button et al. 2013), and in behavioral and biological sciences in general (Fanelli and Ioannidis, 2013 ). Yet we saw that this debate has been almost absent in the EE literature.
In the end, the 1960's saw an ambivalent evolution: EE's statistical tools were more and more sophisticated, but that did not raise an associated interest in more "reflexive" discussion about statistics. EE incorporated statistical "tools" used by Smith (Smith, 1962 (Smith, , 1964 such as NHST and regression but not the reflexive perspective on these tools that Smith had. Words might have played an important role in this matter. Psychologists talk uniformly about "statistics", while in economics the word "econometrics" is often preferred as soon as any statistical analysis is performed on economic problems (which is bias (overestimation of power and significance, underestimation of confidence intervals and sampling variation). Tversky and Kahneman's importance and celebrity probably explains why this study in particular came to be cited in EE. It can be hypothesized that most of the citing articles in EE retain from Tversky and Kahneman's study the general notion of a "cognitive bias" rather than the exact statistical content of this bias. always the case in economic publications). If statistics equals econometrics, EE and statistics do belong to different subfields, methods and academic specialties. It might explain why most experimental economists consider statistical techniques not as methods to discuss (and do not therefore see the need for statistical methodology) but rather as tools made for tailored used by non-EE's specialists.
Guala's technical hypothesis cannot be rejected for the 1960's. But the evolution of statistical methods reject the experiment-dependency hypothesis, since similar studies were not using similar statistics in the 1950's and the 1960's. We therefore argue that this sophistication of statistics without reflection reveals a new research tactics in EE. Experimental economists were now (in the 1960's) truly estimating rationality. Empirical data were not anymore "hints" pointing directly toward theoretical matters. They had to be analyzed at a specific level with specific tools before the theoretical discussion. But these experiments maintained their focus on (non-experimental) economic theory. The purpose was generally to test theoretical predictions, such as for instance Cournot equilibrium (Siegel and Fouraker, 1960) , the random utility model (Becker, DeGroot and Marschak, 1963a) or competitive market equilibrium (Smith, 1962) . Hence the importance of statistical hypothesis testing. The 1960's were a period transition, in which the introduction of statistical methods allowed the first estimation of economic rationality in the lab, but still in a mostly theoretical perspective.
3 Statistical diversity in the experimental economics boom .
The 1970's saw an "explosive" development of EE's literature, as pointed out by Roth (1995) . The great number of EE's publications prevents from analyzing the literature in a quasi-exhaustive and qualitative manner, as we did in the last two sections. Therefore, we had to perform a quantitative analysis.
We were interested in testing Guala's technical hypothesis and "experimentdependency" hypothesis (cf. supra). It these hypotheses were to be rejected, statistics might play an important role in shaping economic rationality in EE. To study statistical methods in EE from 1970 to the present day, we chose to sample representative articles from different domains of EE. Our sampling method is based on Kagel and Roth's classification of EE's subfield (Kagel and Roth, 1995) .
Kagel and Roth's influential handbook contains eight chapter dedicated to the following seven 16 domains: public goods, coordination problems, bargaining experiments, industrial organization, experimental asset markets, auctions, and individual decision-making (DM).
We retrieve all references from each chapter of Kagel and Roth's handbook.
We dropped non-experimental articles and working papers. References were then ranked according to their Google Scholar citations count. We analyzed in each domain the 20 most heavily cited publications. We supposed in doing so that citations are an indicator of how each article was recognized as "central" and thus representative of each subfield. One problem was that there was substantial overlap between these subfields and some articles (particularly influential) appeared as references in two or more chapters of Kagel and Roth's handbook. We thus proceed to some re-allocations. For instance, Tversky et al.'s famous paper on the causes of preference reversal was cited in Kagel's chapter on auction and also in Camerer's chapter on individual-decision making. It belongs much more to the latter for obvious reasons and the article was thus allocated to the individual decision-making domain. We also distinguish in "individual DM" between psychological publications and economic publications, as we suspected important differences in statistical methods between the two disciplines (cf. Supra). We dropped "coordination problems" and "bargaining experiments" because we realized that most references in these subfields were already cited in other chapters. Each article was then classified in one of the following categories:
1. Descriptive statistics, as defined in section 1 2. Statistical test, corresponding to NHST, with three subcategories: parametric, non-parametric, or both parametric and non-parametric testing.
ANOVA was assimilated to multiple two-sample t-tests and thus classified as parametric testing 17 16 The first chapter is an introduction by Al Roth. 17 Yet technically speaking, ANOVA is very similar to linear regression. Statisticians frequently consider the usual ANOVA set-up as a special case of OLS regression (Gelman, 2005) . But we chose to classify ANOVA as statistical testing from a methodological perspective, because it is most commonly used to test the difference between the means of several groups, and is thus analogous to a multiple t-tests. Also, our classification is based on the idea of a general evolution in EE's statistical methodology, that goes from DS to structural modeling. Regression is regarded as a "step toward" structural modeling; it relies indeed on an equation to estimate, which suggests a plausible theoretical model. The crucial difference between ANOVA and regression in this regard is that basic applications of ANOVA mention F-stats and p-values only (ANOVA tables are rare) and do not provide a general "model" to estimate. This probably explains why ANOVA is relatively rare in economics, while it has 3. Regression, distinguishing four subcategories: (a) simple regression (OLS), It should also be noted that distinguishing between structural modeling and mere regression is not obvious, in particular for studies discussing specification problems at length 18 .
Each paper is classified in one category only. Of course, regression implies statistical testing and descriptive statistics but this was made to allow for easier comparisons. Higher categories therefore include lower categories (i.e. an article referenced as "structural modeling" is also implicitly using descriptive statistics, NHST and regression).
been so important in experimental psychology (Rucci and Tweney, 1980) . Similarly, we found that ANOVA was frequent in the psychological "individual DM" subfield and almost absent in the other economic subfields.
18 In our initial classification, maximum-likelihood estimates were required for articles to be classified as "structural modeling". But we found that the "structural approach" could also include some articles using linear OLS regression. For instance, Fischbächer and Gächter (2010) simulate data from several theoretical models. Then they regress simulated data to observed data to see which model fits the best the observations. Here, linear OLS regression and simulation methods are applied to estimate theoretical models; hence this article seems to correspond to our definition of structural modeling. We changed therefore our criteria for inclusion in the "structural modeling" category. The main criteria is the purpose of the regression. If regression techniques are applied to test a previous hypothesis, or merely provide support for an observation, the article was classified as "regression". For these articles, the main matter is not the functional form of the regression, but rather to provide a direct answer about the importance of some experimental parameters (typically, treatments variables are used as regressors). Alternatively, when the equation to estimate in the regression is rather considered as a general "model" (for instance, utility functions, bid functions in auction experiments, learning models), the article was classified as structural modeling. Usually, this involves lengthy discussions of the various models to estimate in the first (non-experimental) part of the article. Another criteria is the consideration of specification problems: typically, several regression models are discussed. Yet our classification might be discussed, because we included in "structural modeling" some articles using very basic statistical tools, for instance linear OLS regression of bid functions in auction experiments. We insist that all of our data and justifications are available on request. , 1971-1995 This section is concerned with the 1970-1995 period, because important changes occurred in EE after 1995, as we shall see in the next section. Table 2 provides the main result of our analysis. A first observation is that structural modeling is very rare in the pre-1995 literature ( To know if each subfield was significantly different from another, we performed Cramer von Mises tests 19 between proportions for each subfield and the 19 We had not enough observations for each subfield and each methods (some ni,j<5) to average proportions for all other subfields excluding the one tested. We found that four subfields (auctions, public goods, individual decision-making -psychology, asset markets) are significantly different (at the 1% level) from the rest of the field. Methodological heterogeneity between subfields suggests that statistics vary according to the theoretical matter at stake. It thus corroborates Guala's experiment-dependency hypothesis (cf. introduction), with statistics merely depending on the "type of experiment". Qualitative insights on our data also confirm Guala's technical hypothesis. Experimental economists do indeed consider statistics as a minor problem. Details on statistical methods are frequently given in footnotes (e.g. Prasnikar and Roth 1992) or in the appendix (e.g., Loewenstein, 1987) . Such publishing practices implicitly assume that statistics are not central in the exposition of experimental results.
But once again, what is important is that experimental economists have not always considered statistics in this technical way. The technical conception of the 1970's was the result of a historical process that has to be explained by research tactics. It was dictated by methodological choices concerning how rationality in economics had to be estimated. What were these research tactics?
The 1971-1995 period shows still a strong theoretical focus in EE. Descriptive statistics plays an important role particularly in public goods, industrial organization and individual decision-making. In these subfields, it can be hypothesized that the main matter was not experimental, in the sense that the central purpose of experiments was to provide quick empirical answers to theoretical problems.
Yet the majority of experiments used statistical hypothesis testing. This reveals that the correspondence between theory and data was not direct, and specific tools had to be applied to allow for such a correspondence. As we argued in the last section, experimental economists were truly estimating rationality, in the sense of choosing between alternative theoretical explanations on the ground of relevant approximations. Data sets were assumed to be samples from larger populations, and relevant properties of the population had to be statistically estimated.
Paradoxically, the technical conception of statistics implied that estimation methods did not play an important role in the methodology of estimating rationality. The main objections could be either empirical or theoretical, but never perform the parametric Chi-square test. Another reason for choosing non-parametric tests was that such tests are "distribution-free" and we did not want to make specific assumptions about the sampling distribution of methods in each subfields (in particular, there might be subgroups of experiments using very similar methods, yielding skewed and non-normal distributions) 20 statistical: reflections on statistical power or on the choice of statistical tests were very rare. Statistical methods in the 1971-1995 period were essential in estimating economic rationality, but nowhere to be found in EE's methodology.
4 Experimetrics and the rise of structural modeling (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) The mid-1990's were a central period for the institutionalization of EE (see chapter 4 in Svorenčík, 2015) . In particular, the review Experimental Economics was founded in 1996 with a first issue published in 1998. The year 1995 saw also the publication of Kagel and Roth's influential handbook, which synthesized important contributions in EE (Kagel and Roth, 1995) . It can therefore be hypothesized that this period played a pivotal role in standardizing and homogenizing EE's publishing practices, including statistical methods. To test this hypothesis, we repeated the analysis of the previous section for the post-1995 period. To sample articles after 1995, we had to rely on recent surveys (Noussair and Tucker, 2013; Potters and Suetens, 2013; Chaudhuri, 2011; Güth and Kocher, 2014; Kagel and Levin, 2014) . Each survey corresponds to a chapter in Kagel and Roth's handbook. There was however no survey on "individual DM", probably because the domain became too big. We considered that the subfield roughly evolved to what is referred to as "behavioral economics", excluding experiments with interaction (e.g. trust game experiments, which are usually considered as belonging to behavioral economics). We retrieved references from two behavioral economics' textbook (Cartwright, 2014; Angner, 2016) . We did not distinguish between economic and psychological individual DM 20 20 The reason was that there are actually very few behavioral economics' articles published in psychological review after 1995. It seems that psychology has been replaced by neuroscience as a main non-economic discipline contributing to behavioral economics. This evolution is of course due to the emergence of neuroeconomics in the 2000's. Neuroscience raise important statistical issues, regarding in particular neuroimaging. We chose however not to consider these problems that are highly specific to neuroscience. 
+10.83% -6% -14% +0.67% +2.17% 12% +9% +21.5% Table 3 : Evolution of statistical methods in EE between 1971 EE between -1995 EE between and 1995 EE between -2010 It should also be noted that regressions get also more "sophisticated" (+6,17% in the "control" subcategory) in the sense that they involve more complex consider-ations pertaining for instance to heteroskedasticity or autocorrelation problems (see previous section for the definition of this subcategory)
Comparisons between pre-1995 and post-1995 results have yet limited meanings because we changed our sampling methods. Table 3 shows however a clear tendency toward homogenization of statistical methods across subdomains. We performed the same Cramer von Mises test as in the previous section between each subfield and the rest of the field. We found that all subfields do not significantly differ anymore at the 1% level. 21
Statistical methods are clearly more homogenous in the later time period.
To conclude, we observe a strong tendency toward both convergence and sophistication of statistical methods. Convergence can be explained by the institutionalization of EE mentioned above, that might have facilitate standardization of EE's methods. Sophistication has probably to be associated to the diffusion of statistical software, that made regression and structural modeling easier to perform.
It is worth noticing that we found no reference to Bayesian methods in all of our sampled articles. Reluctance toward Bayesian statistics is further confirmed through informal talks with experimental economists. For instance, Vernon Smith provided us the following anecdote:
"Jack and I provided a Bayesian report [in Durham, Hirshleifer and Smith 1998], the editor accepted conditional on us doing Fisher's song and dance. We did so in the text using a likelihood ratio test making it easy to add running footnotes to convert the ratio into a posterior. Our revenge came in one test where the classical outcome depended on which H was chosen as the null." 22 Here, the journal editor could not accept to publish a paper in which results were primarily interpreted in a Bayesian way. An absolute condition for publication was to play "Fisher's song and dance", i.e. to adopt the binary framework of NHST (rejection/failure to reject hypotheses at a given significance level).
Typically, Bayesian interpretations in terms of posterior likelihoods might be included as additional remarks in footnotes. This lack of openness toward alternative methods is probably the price to pay for "high-tech" "Fisherian" statistics and for standardization in editorial and publication practices.
Convergence and sophistication in EE's statistical methods should also be associated with the birth of "experimetrics". The word "experimetrics" firstly appear in a 2003 Camerer's textbook (Camerer et al., 2003) and was used by Moffatt to entitle his 2016 textbook on statistical methods in EE (Moffatt, 2015) .
Experimetrics suggests that statistics raise methodological issues in EE at last, and is not anymore technical matter. Yet a closer inspection of Moffatt's book shows that it does not correspond to the intended meaning of the word. Moffatt clearly maintains the technical conception of statistics that we mentioned above: experimetrics "comprises the body of econometric techniques that are customized to experimental applications" 23 . The purpose is to give ready-touse econometric tools to practicians (i.e., experimental economists) whose main contribution and specialty remains in experimental testing of economic theory.
Thus Moffatt's book is very concrete and is filled with pages of STATA codes.
Experimetrics therefore confirms Guala's technical hypothesis. But the decline in statistical diversity across subfields advocates for rejection of the experiment-dependency hypothesis, since different experiments tend to use more and more similar statistical methods. Is Guala's glass half full-half empty? We argue that it is completely empty. As said before, the technical conception was the result of a historical process and reveals new research tactics in which statistical methods do play an important -yet often unnoticed-role in shaping economic rationality. These new research tactics involve the rise of more complex regressions and structural modeling in particular. Moffatt is indeed a strong supporter of structural modeling, defined as a method for the "estimation of the parameters of the utility function" (Moffatt, 2015, p.6) . Structural modeling is mostly used to develop maximum likelihood estimates of models of choice under uncertainty, as advocated by Andersen et al. (2010) , but might also concern other EE's subfields such as auction experiments (Paarsch, Hong et al., 2006) .
Statistical considerations are decisive in structural modeling. The choice of maximum-likelihood estimates and simulation methods shapes directly economic rationality. It is not anymore a matter of testing theoretical predictions, but calibrating and fitting experimental models. Thus statistics play a truly theoretical role, even if it is still considered as a very technical and specialized matter. The importance of statistics is also visible in the large number of cita-tions received by articles using pre-existing data only and specifically dedicated to the econometric aspects pertaining to structural modeling (e.g., Roth and Erev, 1995; Camerer and Hua Ho, 1999) .
Experimetrics thus refers to a genuine statistical estimation of economic rationality, but this recent research tactics does not involve convergence with econometrics. Paradoxically, the defense of structural modeling in EE goes precisely the opposite way of recent evolutions in econometrics. Econometrics' leading figure Joshua Angrist supports the use of "quasi-experimental" methods in applied economics that involve to "taking the "econ" out of econometrics", i.e. less structural modeling of data with previous theoretical models (Angrist and Pischke, 2010). This claim is of course controversial in econometrics, but a recent bibliometric study shows a marked decrease in strutural approach and a relative increase of quasi-experimental methods in econometrics (Panhans and Singleton, 2016) .
Also, Moffatt rests on the idea that EE and econometrics are two rival approaches in applied economics. According to Moffatt, the main advantage of EE's randomized 24 and controlled data is that it allows for the correct identification of treatment effects, "which has always been a central problem in mainstream econometrics [...]The other side of this coin is that, since the data have not been collected in a natural environment, experimental results do not necessarily carry over to the world outside the lab" (Moffatt, 2015, pp.2-3) .
In other words, external validity is the main methodological difficulty in EE; statistical (econometric) problems do not really concern EE. Experimetrics thus refers to a particular understanding of econometrics.
This technical conception does not follow the actual direction of contemporary econometrics: while applied economics is going quasi-experimental and less structural, "experimetrics", i.e. EE's statistical methods, is going more structural. EE and econometrics are not finally converging in the single-unified branche of "applied economics", with lab experiments and statistics at the same methodological status. Experimental economists still do not consider themselves as econometricians (even if more and more econometricians do consider themselves as experimentalists). They have to rely on econometrics but statistics are 24 Most experimental economists do consider like Moffatt that randomization is the hallmark of their discipline (see for instance Levitt and List, 2009 ). Yet it should be noted that this "randomization principle" is questionable. As been argued by Stephen Ziliak, randomization is not necessarily the most adequate method to conduct experiments, and is is very likely to have less statistical power than "balanced" designs (Ziliak et al., 2014; Ziliak and Teather-Posadas, 2016) . Once again, these questions are usually not discussed in EE's literature. a technical problem, not a methodological question.
It should be noted that this technical conception does not prevent statistical sophistication in EE. As said before, estimation of economic rationality depends crucially on statistics in structural modeling. It can be hypothesized that is is precisely because experimental economist are looking for technical and readyto-use tools, possibly in the tailored form of computer code, that EE's statistics are more complex than the ones used in psychology. Yet this technical conception prevents methodological reflexion. Our historical analysis shows that the dominant technical perspective on statistics was the result of a long-run evolution of research tactics, that allowed experimental economists to escape from psychologist's more reflexive culture toward statistics.
Conclusion
Statistical methods in EE have changed a lot from 1931 to the present day.
Early experiments were mostly using descriptive statistics. Empirical data were taken as direct source of evidence for theoretical matter. The rise of statistical hypothesis testing reveals that experimental economists started "estimating" economic rationality in the sense that the relevant properties of a larger population was inferred from the sampled data. But the purpose was still theoretical: statistical testing was mainly about testing non-experimental predictions.
In the more recent period, statistical methods in EE have been increasingly homogenized and sophisticated, with more and more complex regressions and structural modeling. The emergence of experimetrics means that statistics play now a decisive role in the theoretical estimation of economic rationality. Yet it is still considered as a very specialized and technical matter. Our historical analysis shows that this technical conception is the result of a long-run evolution of research tactics, which allowed experimental economists to escape from psychologist's more reflexive culture toward statistics.
